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Abstract
Purpose – This paper examines how board evaluations have emerged as an important tool in 
public policy and corporate practice for enhancing board effectiveness.
Design/methodology/approach – We review the extensive literature on effectiveness and the 
emerging literature on board evaluation to identify ways to assess the current policy direction 
for external evaluation of corporate boards.
Findings – The paper develops an integrated framework of effectiveness that can be used as a 
tool for board evaluation, in particular for externally facilitated exercises.
Research limitations/implications – Through its integration of prior conceptual work this 
paper advances our theoretical understanding of this emerging part of policy and practice, with 
to-date lack much empirical basis. 
Practical implications – The framework we develop shows ways to focus how the practice is 
conducted by boards and external evaluators alike.
Social implications – It can also help policy formation by pointing out the limitations as well as 
benefits of various policy options.
Originality/value – In pointing to ways to develop study of the field through empirical research 
it provides direction for future academic research. It also identifies a need for and direction 
toward the professionalization of practice.
Keywords: Board evaluation, board effectiveness, corporate governance, directors
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1. ‘Where was the board?’
After each of the many corporate collapses over the past quarter of a century, policymakers, 
practitioners and scholars alike have asked the question: Where was the board?  That question 
begs others: What does it take to make a board effective? Indeed, what does it mean to say a board 
is effective? And how could we – policymakers, practitioners, scholars, or even directors 
themselves – evaluate whether it was effective? 
The question of effectiveness has been the subject of much theorizing and empirical 
investigation. Studies using various measures of firm performance as a proxy for board 
effectiveness abound, though often with less than clear results. Can a board may be deemed 
effective when a firm outperforms its sector, if we cannot tell what in anything the board 
contributed? It makes sense to consider a board effective if it staves off disaster, say, by organizing 
an orderly retreat from a failing industry, or by preventing a faulty decision by a hubristic CEO. 
Such good results can go undetected by outsiders. Assessing performance on tasks closer to the 
board’s direct span of action is difficult to do from afar. Board effectiveness, therefore, seems to 
be a local phenomenon, contingent on circumstances, involving relationships between directors 
in the execution of their roles. 
While scholars may therefore have difficulty in identifying the conditions that constitute 
effectiveness, the practical and policy imperatives remain. Beginning in North America in the 
1990s (Cadbury, 1999, describes the Toronto Stock Exchange move; see also NACD, 2001) and 
with increasing force over time, policy initiatives around the world have pressed the boards of 
companies to undertake regular, usually annual evaluations of their performance. Since the 
financial crisis of 2007-09, in the growing number of places that followed the lead of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010, 2018), policy has demanded that boards use external 
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facilitators, in expectation of achieving greater objectivity.1 It quickly became a model for new 
codes for listed companies in other countries in many different settings (OECD, 2015).
The impetus for board evaluation has generated much advice from professional bodies (Jones, 
2011), consultancies (McKinsey & Co., 2011), and well-intentioned directors and other 
practitioners (Archer & Cameron, 2017; Pitcher, 2014), practitioner articles in academic journals 
(Garratt, 1999; McIntyre & Murphy, 2008), and practice-oriented writing by academics 
(Kakabadse, Kakabadse, Moore, Morais, & Goyal, 2017; Leblanc, 2002). These writings 
generated frameworks and checklists for practice, some combining ideas from employee 
performance appraisals with insights about the peculiarities of boards (Spencer Stuart, 2017). 
Theoretical and empirical understanding of board evaluation is, however, comparatively 
underdeveloped.
The push has met with considerable compliance (cf. Grant Thornton, 2011, 2016), but also 
with some push-back. Practitioner accounts suggest resistance, acquiescence, but also enthusiasm 
for a process traditionally associated with staff development and discipline rather than those in 
the upper echelons. 
In the next section we examine how practitioners discuss board effectiveness and how 
scholars have conceptualize it, and then explore the emerging literature on board evaluation. 
Integrating the two, the paper develops a revised model of board effectiveness, and develops of a 
research agenda with implications for practice and policy. We conclude with observations about 
factors that practitioners, boards and facilitators might consider in designing evaluation exercises. 
2. Board effectiveness
The work of boards involves complex interactions of individuals in which independence of 
mind fosters both benefits and threats to effectiveness (Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005). In 
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theorizing board cognition and effectiveness, Forbes and Milliken (1999) write that boards differ 
from conventional groups in that they are “large, elite, and episodic decision-making groups that 
face complex tasks pertaining to strategic-issue processing”. But they are large (typically a dozen 
or more); the presence of outside, or “non-executive” directors, who serve the company only part-
time may mean less than full commitment; and their elite make-up holds the promise and threat 
of strong individuality. Moreover, boards perform two distinct and at times contradictory roles 
(Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013): service (providing advice), and control (supervising and 
disciplining). 
Moreover, “outside” non-executives become insiders, and the “inside” executives to step 
outside of their roles as managers. This role ambiguity creates the liminality in which creativity 
can develop (Concannon & Nordberg, 2018), but only by suspending the hierarchy. This is not to 
say that boards are theoretically or empirically without hierarchy. But since Cadbury (1992), 
policy in the UK and jurisdictions that followed its lead, has sought to counteract it by separating 
the roles of chairman and CEO and enhancing director independence, and thus – in theory – their 
effectiveness.2 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) identify key processes of corporate boards: their effort norms; 
how they use their knowledge and skills; and the more complex one of “cognitive conflict.” The 
last is vital to challenging senior managers and the chief executive, even though it threatens 
cohesiveness. And cohesiveness itself is double-edged; boards can be too friendly. 
A benefit of the Forbes and Milliken (1999) approach is that it seeks to identify elements that 
can either be verified externally or where suitable proxies exist. Board demography and the mix 
of knowledge and skills on the board yield information that is likely to affect the “black box” of 
board processes. For example, one study demonstrated a lack of confidence among directors about 
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their peers’ abilities to deal with complex financial matters and risk (Ingley & van der Walt, 2008). 
Effort norms can be estimated by the increasingly common corporate reporting of attendance at 
board and committee meetings. But such metrics leave out two elements that have been prominent 
in policy and in the literature: board structures and the social characteristics of directors. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) note the importance of structures in shaping the work of boards, 
while Nordberg and McNulty (2013) show the centrality of structure in shaping policy. Structural 
mechanisms include elements such as the balance of executive and non-executives directors, often 
called board independence (Chen, 2011; Johanson & Østergren, 2010); CEO duality (Krause, 
Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014); and board committees (Yeh, Chung, & Liu, 2011). Board structure 
is not only a tool for monitoring; it can also signal effectiveness through highlighting access to 
external resources (Certo, 2003).
Other scholars warn of the limitations of relying on structures in understanding effectiveness 
of boards (e.g. Roberts, 2002). Kim and Cannella (2008), for example, suggest that such social 
capital is an important factor in director selection as it contributes to later board effectiveness. 
While aspects of such contributions can be assessed with publicly disclosed information, 
others require personal contact. Leblanc and Gillies (2005) find that director effectiveness, 
defined as the ability of directors to influence outcomes, can be traced to three factors: their 
persuasiveness, the predictability of a director’s dissent and consensus, and whether a director’s 
orientation was individualistic or collectivist. Of these, persuasiveness is “by far the most 
important” (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Persuasiveness can help to overcome skepticism and build 
trust, thus reinforcing cohesiveness when challenged by cognitive conflict. Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004b) see “board intellectual capital”, a composite of board- and director-level factors, as 
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contributing to effective decision-making. Like Leblanc and Gillies (2005), they focus attention 
on social interactions as central to board dynamics. 
With similar intent, Charas (2015) posits that directors’ “cultural intelligence” plays an 
important role in effectiveness. She draws upon Earley and Mosakowski (2004b), who reflect 
“how able people are to empathize, work with, direct, and interact with other people”, which 
facilitates behavioral change in complex situations (Triandis, 2006). This characteristic of 
directors would seem to help them cope with the tensions between cognitive conflict and board 
cohesiveness by preventing cohesiveness from tipping into groupthink and cognitive conflict from 
engendering affective conflict. An overview of their themes appears in Table 1.
------------------ Insert Table 1 about here ------------------
This points us towards a relationship, under-articulated in the Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
model, in which director characteristics influence effort norms, cognitive conflict, and board 
cohesiveness, and perhaps the degree to which they use their knowledge and skills. Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) see the relationship between conflict and cohesion and central to board 
effectiveness.  But cognitive conflict works against the cohesiveness needed to keep their often 
large, elite membership headed towards a decision. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that boards develop coping routines to overcome the 
tension between their service and control functions (Nicholson, Pugliese, & Bezemer, 2017), 
performance of which is influenced by cognitive conflict and cohesiveness. In a rare study 
analyzing video evidence of board deliberations, Nicholson et al. (2017) find directors engage in 
“systematic and routine behaviours that initially appear paradoxical”. 
Cultural intelligence, persuasiveness, and the development of coping routines are 
characteristics and behavior that are difficult to assess through public disclosure. They form 
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pressure points that would seem to affect the processes of effort levels, boardroom challenge and 
the delivery of skills and knowledge central to board effectiveness. Doing so is difficult, however, 
without the ability of observe the board in action, of which the study by Nicholson et al. (2017) 
is a very rare example. From practical and policy perspectives, difficulties in gaining access place 
the onus on board evaluation. 
How these relationships work in practice is, therefore, an area of current and important 
investigation. Moreover, other scholars point to the quality of information provided to directors 
and similar mundane aspects of the work of boards as contributing to board effectiveness as inputs 
to board processes (Roy, 2011; Zhang, 2010), in which developments of technology can 
contribute to shaping the decision-making of boards (Massie, 2015). With those factors lying 
behind effectiveness, what can we learn about how to evaluate them?
3. Evaluating boards
The nascent literature on board evaluation is dominated by practitioner experiences and 
process prescription to inform policy for board evaluation (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2002; Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2004a). Heracleous and Lan (2002) offer a 20-question tool to evaluate directors, focusing 
on their knowledge and skills, that is, inputs to board work, but not their behaviour or 
performance. Aly and Mansour (2017) reconstruct the balanced scorecard in Kaplan and Norton 
(1992) to take into account customer-oriented metrics to the work of boards. 
Accounts by Kiel, Nicholson, and Barclay (2005) and  Kiel and Nicholson (2005) present a 
seven-step process: the objectives, who will be evaluated, what will be evaluated, who will be 
asked, what techniques will be used, who will conduct the evaluation, and what will be done with 
the results. 
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Minichilli, Gabrielsson, and Huse (2007) condense these seven into four: who evaluates, 
content, audience, and conduct. They then use two of them – the evaluator (internal or external) 
and the “addressee” (internal or external) – to devise an analytic framework in which audiences 
imply a broad category of purpose: External users, including shareholders, regulators, and other 
stakeholders, expect compliance. Internal users – directors, committees, and the board as a whole 
– and some other users (academics and researchers) who sit on the cusp – share the goal of board 
improvement. If evaluation does lead to greater effectiveness, then the organization can use it to 
demonstrate its compliance to external audiences. We start our analysis looking at the purpose 
and conduct of evaluation, who evaluates, and finally content. 
3.1. Purpose and conduct of evaluation
Writing about evaluation work in general, Fetterman (2001) argues that evaluators not only 
judge performance; they collaborate in its improvement. Long (2006) also argues for a focus on 
internal purposes: Evaluation encourages teamwork and improves leadership, she claims. Being 
evaluated contributes to directors’ identification with the board and organization. This suggests 
candid board evaluation can encourage boardroom challenge even as it builds cohesiveness. 
Empirical studies are few and far between, but they support the contention that evaluation can 
change board dynamics. A survey of company secretaries of 29 UK listed companies described 
whether and if what form evaluations took place and with want consequences (Dulewicz & 
Herbert, 2008). It found that evaluations led to director resignations in a third of the cases (cited 
in Nicholson, Kiel, & Tunny, 2012). However, the limited sample size raises questions about how 
to interpret the responses. 
On conduct, studies show a split between accountability-driven concern for verifiable 
approaches and examination of relational considerations. Some writers argue that boards need to 
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measure individual director and group competencies (Cascio, 2004), supplemented by upward 
feedback and peer review (Garratt, 1999). Others seek more nuanced insights from evaluation. 
Huse (2005) suggests that to understand board behavior, processes need to be observed and 
assessed. This suggests a qualitative, ethnographic inquiry.
In a study of board dynamics of family firms, Vandebeek, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, and 
Huybrechts (2016) see evaluations helping to erode hierarchy and heighten challenge and 
cohesiveness. That creates liminality in the boardroom (Concannon & Nordberg, 2018) despite 
the natural hierarchy of the owner-manager-director. 
Beneficial effects are not the only possible outcome, however. A questionnaire-and-interview 
study of Norwegian boards found that directors saw evaluation serving hygienic purposes (i.e. 
conforming to external demands for board evaluation) rather than enhancing board performance 
(Rasmussen, 2015). If such outcomes are conspiratorial, they may increase cohesiveness but at 
the expense of cognitive conflict. Done manipulatively, they could damage cohesiveness and 
increase conflict. This study suggests directors may see evaluations as serving mainly cosmetic 
goals, irrespective of the processes used or who evaluates.
3.2. Who evaluates
As board evaluation was beginning to emerge as a corporate governance imperative, Conger, 
Finegold, and Lawler (1998) observed: “The most obvious impediment to periodic board 
evaluations is that no one can perform them but the board itself.” Boards sit at the top of corporate 
hierarchies, after which there is no point of appeal. This assertion has been overtaken by events 
now that policy has embraced the use of external facilitators, so boards have little choice. Both 
Kiel and Nicholson (2005) and Minichilli et al. (2007) identify a range of options, and we focus 
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here on the three categories that embrace the others: self-evaluation, externally facilitated 
evaluation, and evaluation led by the chair. 
Self-assessment. Minichilli et al. (2007) view self-evaluation as a valuable tool for 
improvement as it provides time and space for self-reflection on board processes and internal 
culture, such as decision-making, trust, emotions and board interactions. They argue that directors 
can be open about feelings during the self-evaluation as the processes will be kept confidential 
from outsiders. Internal evaluation also alleviates concerns over commercial confidentiality 
(Rasmussen, 2015). Kiel and Nicholson (2005) argue that with selection of a trusted person to 
lead it, internal evaluation provides “open and honest feedback”. However, others see internal 
evaluation inhibiting openness about problematic board dynamics (Ungureanu, 2013). There are 
also reasons to doubt whether boards can achieve the impartiality needed for self-evaluation. 
Writing about personal psychology, Billow (2011) says self-awareness remains tentative, 
uncertain and evolving. Such concerns lie behind the policy push for external evaluation.
External facilitation. Practitioner articles, theorists, and policy directives assert that effective 
evaluation of behavior requires an external view (e.g. Pitcher, 2014). With outside experts without 
vested interests but who understand group dynamics, assumptions of monolithic behavior in group 
decision-making are removed. For boards, this can help to recognize the dysfunctional group 
dynamics reported by Conger et al. (1998). Inviting the evaluator to attend meetings on a regular 
basis can prevent groupthink (Bernthal & Insko, 1993). If subjectivity and self-interest is present 
in self-evaluations (Conger et al., 1998) then external facilitation can help. According to Machold 
and Farquhar (2013), an “informed outsider” can challenge “deep-routed beliefs” of directors and 
offer “opportunities for reflection to both the researchers and the board members.” 
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In contrast to the inherent hierarchy evident in employee appraisals, external evaluators need 
not be viewed as standing in judgment over the board. Writing in the context of general, rather 
than board-specific evaluation, Ensminger, Kallemeyn, Rempert, Wade, and Polanin (2015) 
suggest evaluators resemble coaches, guiding toward optimum performance (a view endorsed for 
boards by Independent Audit, 2016). 
There is a danger that boards or individual directors may change behavior under observation, 
putting the validity of the evaluation into doubt. Politicking may also take place outside the 
boardroom, which external evaluators may not see. Bailey and Peck (2013) suggest that coalition-
building behind the scenes influences boardroom dynamics, which can also affect board decision-
making (van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009). An evaluator needs to be alert to politics within 
the group and the history of the dynamics informing the relevant relationships. 
Evaluation by chair – a hybrid model? Practitioner accounts suggest that a common method 
of board evaluation is for the chairman to conduct evaluations. We have found no study that 
focuses on this approach specifically, but the practice arguably combines the confidentiality of 
internal evaluation with some degree of the distance provided by external facilitators. It could as 
easily lack the objectivity, be subject to the politics, and damage the already tense relationship 
between boardroom challenge and the sense of common purpose. 
This discussion suggests the choice of the evaluator will influence both the types of data that 
will be collected and the approach to analysis. Internal or external evaluations may draw upon 
both verifiable metrics and observational approaches. Externally led evaluations may lack subject 
expertise and a rounded view of the business context that an insider would have, but they bring 
impartiality. These trade-offs seem to lie beneath the policy preference for external facilitation, 
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but not all the time. Whoever conducts the evaluation will nonetheless need to consider the 
question of what will be evaluated. 
3.3. Content of evaluation
If the objective is to improve performance, then it seems logical to consider what the literature 
tells us about board effectiveness. This might includeactivities and resources of the board, 
emphasizing its strategic role (Conger et al., 1998) and inputs and processes, including 
information management (Epstein & Roy, 2005). As discussed above, some factors can be 
assessed without direct access to the boardroom, but others – behavior and social skills – seem to 
require observation or personal assessment. 
Director characteristics. Demographic characteristics are known, and career details provide 
many insights about knowledge and skills of individual directors. Assessing the social capital of 
directors may be possible to an extent from the outside, as studies of board interlocks and social 
networks have shown. But insofar as social capital involves the interpersonal relations on the 
board, which lead to cognitive conflict and board cohesiveness, the proxies used in such outside 
methods would seem to be of little use. Moreover, such data sources will say little about the 
person’s persuasiveness (Leblanc, 2005), thought processes (Earley & Mosakowski, 2004b), or 
sensitivity to cultural differences (Charas, 2015). Such personal characteristics may be difficult 
to judge in peer-based evaluations or those with the chairman as evaluator. The literature further 
suggests that a crucial link between board evaluation and how director social characteristics relate 
to cognitive conflict and use of knowledge and skills. Doing so seems to point not just to external 
evaluation but also more ethnographic approaches of board observation, such as used in the 
research by Nicholson et al. (2017).
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Board characteristics. Forbes and Milliken (1999) identify demography as a board 
characteristic, that is, the mix of ages, genders, professional backgrounds, and other factors that 
the board collectively possesses. Diversity is a remedy for excessive cohesiveness, though the 
results of empirical studies are less clear about the impact on task and firm performance (Homberg 
& Bui, 2013; Van der Walt, Ingley, Shergill, & Townsend, 2006). Many of these characteristics 
can be determined from the outside. Similarly, director backgrounds provide insights about 
knowledge and skills. Board structures are increasingly publicly available. Given another current 
policy imperative to expand board diversity, attention might be directed in the evaluation process 
to understanding how such demographic considerations influence the conduct of board processes, 
including the process of evaluation.
Board processes. Because they are difficult to observe, processes are arguably where prior, 
structure policy prescriptions have failed to forestall malfeasance. Effort norms can be viewed in 
disclosures of attendance records at board and committee meetings, though only incompletely. 
How directors use the mix of knowledge and skills cannot be seen from outside. Cognitive conflict 
is often consciously hidden, becoming apparent only during dysfunction and then only when 
cohesiveness collapses. 
More prosaically, boards hide information for understandable reasons of confidentiality 
(Zhang, 2010). But all these processes embody political forces, where the effects of director 
persuasiveness, cultural and emotional intelligence, and to some extent social capital seem likely 
to come into play. Moreover, processes that might counteract the intent of board structures. For 
example, the effect of open invitations to executive directors to attend meetings of “independent” 
audit committees would be difficult to assess without observation. 
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Task performance. The outcomes of the board can sometimes be verified through its 
decisions. Forbes and Milliken (1999) were careful not to posit a direct link between task 
performance and firm performance; too many factors come between one and the other. In the case 
of listed companies, many of the most important decisions must be publicly disclosed, providing 
verification on important matters and occasionally evidence of faltering cohesiveness. But in the 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) model, the difficult, inverted U relationship between cohesiveness is 
the one most in need of evaluation, and its tipping point is one that seems difficult to assess even 
by someone impartial and on the inside of all decisions. Seeing how director social characteristics 
play into board cohesiveness and into the difficult relationship between cohesiveness and 
cognitive conflict argues for external evaluation. With a skilled chair evaluating, whose 
persuasiveness (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005) signals sensitivity to the social setting, the evaluator is 
still someone involved in the decision process. Evaluating those tense situations would be 
difficult.
4. A framework for board evaluation
The preceding discussion leads us to identify certain pressure points in board evaluation 
(Figure 1). By that we mean the factors and relationships between them where in-person 
evaluation, and more specifically evaluation through external facilitation, are likely to be most 
beneficial. Our model builds on Forbes and Milliken (1999) with its crucial inverted U between 
cohesiveness and performance. 
----------------- Place Figure 1 about here -----------------
First, we make explicit the need in evaluation processes for attention to the social 
characteristics of directors. These are implicit in Forbes and Milliken (1999), but given their 
importance in the board effectiveness literature, board evaluation exercise would do well to 
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understand what they are and how they are put to use. Second, we add structures to the list of 
board characteristics, giving examples of some that the literature sees as contributing to 
effectiveness. Third, we add board information to the processes phase in Forbes and Milliken 
(1999), an area that is under-studying in the literature, but which practitioners say is important to 
effectiveness.3 
Some aspects of board evaluation can be assessed at a distance, we suggest, even by complete 
outsiders, including regulators, corporate governance ratings agencies, and investment analysts. 
If reporting of the factors, signified in the model by boxes, became standardized, those types of 
data would provide a high-level analysis needed for portfolio management and policymaking, but 
perhaps not for decisions by individual boards.
The relationships, signified by arrows, are perhaps more difficult to assess under the 
circumstances of confidentiality associated with boards. Some of those specified by Forbes and 
Milliken (1999), in particular process conflicts, feed into task performance are particularly 
sensitive, but may become apparent during board evaluation (signified by bolded arrows). 
Relationships we posit for the additional factors may also be accessible to evaluators (signified 
by the broken arrows). 
We believe the framework can serve as a guide for evaluators, whether internal or external, 
in trying to determine which data to collect and how to collect it. It also provides a basis for 
developing theoretical insights about the benefits and limitations of board evaluation, as well as 
a guide to policy to help appreciate where disclosure can add value or face justified resistance. It 
thus informs an agenda for further research. 
The policy direction that motivates this study also seeks internal improvement, though with 
the intent of restoring external trust and greater accountability. So, how can we achieve both 
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objectives, and what role does the method of evaluation play? It also raises questions about the 
timing of evaluations.
4.1. Research for board improvement
As we have discussed, the limited literature on board evaluation suggests that internal, self-
evaluation takes different forms, including director self- and peer-assessment or evaluation 
conducted by the chairman. External evaluation holds the promise of greater objectivity but with 
risks of mistrust and lack of contextual understanding. 
Internal evaluation. The limited literature to date, much of it written by practitioners or 
practitioner-scholars, suggests that board self-assessment can help diagnose problems. But we see 
only limited evidence so far concerning how the process of evaluation affects the processes of 
effectiveness. Qualitative research can help us identify the benefits and limitations of this 
approach, especially concerning whether evaluation helps to ameliorate the tensions between 
cognitive conflict and board cohesiveness or lead directors to use the knowledge and skills they 
possess. 
The practice of board evaluation conducted by the chairman also requires specific research. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests it is one of the most common methods among companies that do not 
have CEO duality. But the chairman may not be neutral; insofar as the chair steers the work of 
nominations, the occupant of that post may contribute to dysfunctional as well as functional board 
dynamics. If so, these factors too suggest we need to understand better the comparative benefits 
and drawbacks of chair-led evaluations and those undertaken through external facilitation. 
External evaluation. The framework developed in this paper points to a need to detect and 
interpret deficits in cultural and emotional intelligence, social capital, and persuasiveness that the 
literature associates with board effectiveness. Research could also help to establish whether 
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evaluator-as-coach (Ensminger et al., 2015) might enhance individual director performance or 
alter group dynamics. Case studies can investigate the varieties of processes and evaluation 
techniques in use and document contingencies associated with special circumstances (i.e. at times 
of low, medium or high pressure) when evaluations occur. 
Moreover, external facilitators are better placed than researchers to identify problem areas 
that receive scant if any attention in the literature reviewed here. The problem of “divisive cliques” 
(Tricker, 2015) and other dysfunctional practices in boards is something an external facilitator is 
in privileged position to solve. Research into external facilitation might collect such insights, 
which can deepen our understanding of board as well as to improve board practice and the practice 
of facilitation.
4.2. Research for compliance and accountability 
The policy push for board evaluations was motivated by repeated waves of corporate 
malfeasance among large, listed corporations. Policy sees such evaluations as ways to enhance 
the accountability of boards to their investors. Such actions help not only to improve task 
performance but also to build confidence of those outside that such action is being undertaken 
seriously. However, it is difficult to determine whether the effort is merely for compliance. 
Internal evaluation. Practitioner and academic accounts suggest that, performed in a 
conscientious and constructive way, boards’ self-evaluation can generate information with 
implications for investors. While such information is rarely disclosed, cognitive conflict 
occasionally becomes public in leaks about boardroom dissent or open hostility between directors.  
These observations point to a need for research with investors over the adequacy of current 
reporting measures about the observable characteristics of effectiveness. Research with 
investment managers might help establish the usefulness of disclosures concerning the 
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justifications for or remedial actions taken when effort appears to fall below the norm. Similar 
questions could be raised about other board characteristics or processes that become the subject 
of internal board discussion and evaluation. 
External evaluation. The use of an external facilitator for board evaluations is increasingly 
a reporting requirement and a signal of the adoption of best practice. Such reports are increasingly 
used by corporate governance by governance ratings agencies to assist investment managers with 
voting. Research with investment managers could help to establish the perceived usefulness of 
externally led exercises. In this regard it would be useful for research to distinguish between the 
types of uses, whether for investment decisions (i.e. buy-sell-hold; lend-or-not), voting decisions, 
or understanding investor engagement and stewardship (McNulty & Nordberg, 2016). 
This analysis also suggests that using external evaluation for compliance with external 
accountability can be a waste of resources and point to a missed opportunity for improvement. If 
compliance with policy targets slips into symbolic management, the appearance of best practice 
may even send false signals (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Here research with boards as well as 
investment managers would help to distinguish the frequency and perception of such actions and 
warn about the limitations of policy prescriptions for board evaluation. 
4.3. When to evaluate
The policy environment in many countries is pressing for regular board evaluations, generally 
annually, and for externally facilitated ones less frequently. By their regularity, such periodic 
recommendations seem to satisfy the need for compliance and accountability. But as the 
discussion above has indicated, the value of compliance-oriented evaluation may lead to symbolic 
management and discourage having external evaluators present at the time when important 
decisions are on the board’s agenda. 
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One of the issues is whether boards might be better advised to conduct evaluations not so 
much periodically, but rather when serious issues feature prominently. Boards might feel it a 
distraction to have an extra person in the room during sensitive decision-making, however well 
trusted that person might be. But learning about the sources of conflict, whether cognitive or 
affective in nature, and what issues excessive cohesiveness brings would be better observed and 
managed in a setting of important decisions. For example, Mellahi (2005) found that behavioral 
dynamics influences the poor decision-making ahead of the 2003 failure of Australian firm HIH. 
Research might help us learn whether evaluations undertaken in the moderate heat of important 
decisions can improve later outcomes when existential issues arise. It could also help address 
questions about the efficacy of annual evaluation advocated in policy. 
4.4. Moving things forward
This paper suggests further research would help corporations deal with needs for board 
improvement and external accountability. The policy agenda would also benefit from a better 
understanding the limitations as well as the possibilities of specifying board processes and setting 
reporting requirements, as well as how to conduct public reporting (McIntyre & Murphy, 2008). 
Sponsorship by professional bodies like the Society for Corporate Governance in the US or the 
Institute of Company Secretaries and Administrators in the UK could help overcome barriers to 
access and benefit both corporations themselves and policymakers and open a wider path to 
professionalization of evaluation work. The research agenda outlined here would benefit from a 
combination of qualitative, ethnographic and interview-based research, survey-based study of 
practices and effects-based quantitative work on the relationship between board evaluation and 
various measures of board effectiveness and investor actions. 
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A potential extension of such research concerns the use of evaluations for improving the 
performance of boards on private companies and non-corporate entities like charities, social 
enterprises and government agencies, and even boards of subsidiaries of larger corporations. 
Many adopt corporate governance practices designed for listed companies, and anecdotal 
evidence as well as corners of the growing literature on board evaluations suggests these too 
would benefit from attention to ideas sketched above. 
None of the research we reviewed considers in any detail a practical matter: the cost of board 
evaluation, in evaluator fees and director time. In relation to the revenues of a large listed company 
they are probably insignificant, but they become more so the smaller the enterprise. As a 
proportion of the operating costs of the board itself they can be large, through external facilitation 
and in director time. Any research und rtaken could help us also to understand the benefits and 
costs. 
5. Conclusions
Board evaluation is firmly on the agenda of corporations, policymakers and academics. This 
paper makes some tentative steps towards theorizing board evaluation and its potential for impact 
on the elusive problems associated with understanding how director characteristics and board 
processes and structures contribute to effective deliberations. In highlighting the internal- and 
external-facing purposes of evaluations and the differences made through the two main 
contrasting methods of evaluating, it points to a research agenda of academic interest but also of 
importance to corporations and policy in corporate governance. 
By adapting and integrating different conceptualizations of board effectiveness we provide 
an analytic framework that can be used to explain some of the unanswered questions in the 
developing literature of board evaluation. It also has practical uses for companies seeking to 
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undertake board evaluations and for policymakers in understanding the limitations and even 
unintended consequences of mandating use of the practice. For those involved in the work of 
board evaluation – whether internally conducted or externally facilitated – with further 
development this tool can provide a template for the conduct of board evaluations that can add 
value as well as highlight potential areas of risk. 
1 While the original UK recommendation for external facilitation applied only to larger listed companies 
(those in the FTSE350 index), the latest version of the code (FRC, 2018) extended it to all companies but 
applied the every-third-year frequencies to the FTSE350. It also urged fuller disclosure of how 
evaluations were conducted, including the “nature and extent of an external evaluator’s contact” with 
directors, the outcomes, and action taken. 
2 Two-tier boards are a special case, where all directors are non-executive and so have greater 
independence but also constrained information access (Bezemer, Peij, de Kruijs, & Maassen, 2014).
3 We are grateful for this observation to a participant at the British Academy of Management conference 
in 2017, where we presented this paper. 
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Figure 1: Pressure points in board evaluation
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Table 1 – Factors in board effectiveness and evaluation
Theme Core analyses Related and supporting literature
Director characteristics, cognition, processes
Cognition and processes, 
highlighting the tensions between 
boardroom challenges and group 
identification
Forbes and 
Milliken 
(1999)
Warther (1998); Van den Berghe and Baelden 
(2005); Murphy and McIntyre (2007)
Directors’ social capital and 
relationships
Nicholson 
and Kiel 
(2004b)
Kim and Cannella (2008); Johnson, Schnatterly, and 
Hill (2013)
Sensitivity; cultural intelligence Charas (2015) Earley and Mosakowski (2004a); Triandis (2006); 
Roberts (2002)
Director persuasiveness Leblanc and 
Gillies (2005)
McNulty and Pettigrew (1996)
Structures, processes
Firm and institutional contingencies 
affecting the interplay of structure, 
processes and cognition
Zahra and 
Pearce (1989)
D'Amato and Gallo (2016); Schmidt and Brauer 
(2006); Cornforth (2001); Del Guercio, Dann, and 
Partch (2003); Dahya and Travlos (2000); McNulty, 
Florackis, and Ormrod (2013)
Quality of board information Zhang (2010) Roy (2011); Massie (2015)
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